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October 2026

Voice of
TKP
Monthly international magazine

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*The collapse of the political
sphere and a government bent
on harakiri*



Workers join the Party, the fight grows stronger



Construction workers during their days-long resistance on the roof of the building they were working on in Sakarya.

The collapse of the political sphere and a government bent on harakiri

Kemal Okuyan - TKP General Secretary



E.n.: Since March 2025, judicial and administrative interventions targeting the main opposition in Turkey – particularly CHP-run municipalities and potential presidential candidates – have occupied the centre of the political agenda. In this article, Kemal Okuyan argues that the interventions against the opposition and the steady narrowing of the electoral sphere should be understood not so much as an attempt by the government to monopolise politics, but as the collapse of the existing political sphere itself. He discusses the dilemmas this collapse creates for the government, the possible ways forward for the capitalist system, and the opportunities the resulting vacuum may open up for revolutionary politics.

In this article, which was published in the September issue of TKP's monthly magazine Ortaklaşa, Kemal Okuyan examines the political alignments and debates emerging around this process. He also returns to its now largely clear ideological and political substance, what it means for Turkey's future, and the position and struggle of communists in relation to it.

We have lost count. How many mayors have been arrested, how many removed from office, how many mayors and municipal council members have switched parties – it is impossible to keep track anymore. The AKP crossed the psychological threshold long ago. There are now no political or social barriers left to the government reshaping elected offices as it sees fit.

At first, the process was thought to have begun as a way of eliminating a presidential candidate. The operation of 19 March 2025 meant bringing down Erdoğan's strongest rival. But it did not stop there. The results of the 2024 local elections were dismantled one by one. Then came direct intervention in the main opposition party itself. The CHP, whose chairman was effectively appointed by the government, split in two. And still it did not end there.

The defections continue, and there is talk of new operations. Özgür Özel¹ is expected to distance himself even further from Ekrem İmamoğlu²; Mansur Yavaş³ is not even to entertain the thought of running for president; Özgür Özel is to be the candidate, but he had

better not get too carried away with the idea either...

What else? What else is there?

For our President to stand for office one more time, an early election is required. But the economy is in bad shape and will not recover in 2027 either, which means the elections need to be held on schedule. They seriously floated the idea: *"Let's bring them forward by a week and call it an early election."* Personally, I think they should have said: *"Why burden the country with ridiculous legal contrivances like this? Let us simply rise above such things and have the government and opposition jointly proclaim Mr Erdoğan's candidacy."*

And in fact they did!

As I was writing these lines, we read the proposal: let every party declare his candidacy, and let us all elect our president together. How fitting. Apparently, in the parliamentary elections, people would still be free to vote for whichever party they liked!

A minister of the cabinet has already declared that much: the next election will be held to elect Erdoğan one more time.

According to some, everything that has been happening amounts to nothing more than the government declaring a **monopoly over politics**.

That is certainly the intention. But is that the outcome?

Across the world, the right to elect and be elected is being systematically undermined — everywhere, and through different methods. "De-electoralisation" is a useful concept. But we must also ask what is being put in its place. State coercion alone is clearly not enough to govern a society. Elections are one of humanity's most important achievements, but under relations of oppressor and oppressed they are also a mechanism skilfully used to persuade, contain and distract the oppressed.

To render this mechanism dysfunctional, or to all but eliminate it, you need to replace it with **something at least as powerful**. Throughout the twentieth century, the military coups and fascist

dictatorships seen in many countries were deployed to break the resistance of the working class and dismantle it organisationally and politically. Some of these regimes, through various forms of demagoguery, won the support of significant sections of society. Some fled high inflation, others instability, others "anarchy," and sought refuge in dictatorships. They **gave up** the right to elect and be elected.

As the power of that demagoguery faded, dissatisfaction with these dictatorships grew. Some were brought down by popular movements; others ended through the manoeuvring of bourgeois forces adept at compromise.

The tendency toward "de-electoralisation" that we see in the world today, however, feeds **not on the presence** of a strong working-class movement, but **on its absence**. The multinational monopolies, with no organised resistance standing in their way, want more — and then more still. Meanwhile, rivalry is intensifying among the states, or blocs of states, on which these monopolies rely. Such is the law of capitalism.

In this rivalry, they do not want "domestic politics" getting underfoot. They want to act as swiftly and with as little oversight as their rivals. And after all, there is no "popular" movement worth taking seriously anyway.

Every government thinks this way.

But...

They have nothing to offer society other than anxiety, fear, helplessness and the prospect of no future. And on top of that, they are going to try to make elections even more meaningless!

Let us forget, for a moment, everything written above — forget the past and forget the world. Let us return to Turkey and to the present.

What is happening today is not the government declaring a monopoly over the political sphere. It is the destruction of the political sphere itself. We are almost there.

For them to be able to govern the country in this way, they

would need another compelling story to sell. There are plenty of stories, of course... The condition of pensioners, the condition of workers, the state of the stock market, education, hospitals... Stories abound. But as is obvious, there is no success story capable of replacing elections and the political sphere. It is more like a horror film.

A monopoly over politics, they say...

If the AKP were a young, rising opposition party offering an alternative to a society exhausted, weary and fed up with the current government, then the wind behind it might allow it temporarily to succeed in de-electoralising and depoliticising the country.

But after twenty-five years in government, a party could only get away with telling society, "Your right to vote and stand for election no longer matters to me," if said citizens were living in abundance and prosperity.

I repeat: what is happening today is not monopolisation of the political sphere. It is the collapse of politics as a whole.

One could name a dozen figures from within the AKP camp itself, who have pointed to this collapse and expressed their unease (perhaps even panic) about it. As the government intervenes against political actors within the same system with the intensity of a class antagonism, it is not dominating the political sphere per se, but is liquidating it.

Because society, including the AKP's own base, is not convinced by this level of antagonism.

An election whose outcome is already seen as a foregone conclusion in Erdoğan's favour could never amount to a "political victory." Elections have already lost a great deal of their credibility.

The real question is whether the government is capable of putting anything in place of the political sphere.

Let me remind the readers of what we said when the interventions against the CHP began: **Every blow the government strikes**

against the opposition, weakens the government itself.

At this point, because the political sphere that once enveloped the AKP (and perhaps even made it appear preferable by comparison) has evaporated, every disaster, from the so-called peace process to ever-persistent inflation, from the funds scandal to other forms of corruption, now lands directly on the head of the government.

Had the AKP not narrowed the political sphere so drastically with its own hands, it might have been able to **shed some deadweight** and escape under the slogan “*we are cleaning up our own house.*”

But it is far too late for that now.

The question that must now be asked is how a system can continue on its path when its government has been worn down from every direction, while its opposition is weak and has lost its ability to act independently. Neo-Ottomanism is, for a number of reasons, a perfectly plausible strategy from the standpoint of the capitalist class, and Ömer Koç⁴ recently gave it his blessing once again. Yet alongside the objective

obstacles preventing this strategy from being implemented, a very serious subjective obstacle has now emerged: the AKP, which matured this strategy, has largely lost the skill and control required to carry it out.

One option is to make a move that would place implementation of this strategy under the baton of an actor standing relatively outside the evaporating political arena.

Another option is the answer to the question we asked above — “*Can the government put something in place of the political arena?*”: War.

It is of course also possible that the AKP may cling to power despite losing so much credibility and excitement. But the longer this continues, the greater the cost to the system, i.e., to capitalist rule. The system will therefore put pressure on the AKP either to transform itself or to generate some new formation from within its own ranks. As I stressed above, such a renewal would require far more than simply “shedding some dead weight.”

There is also a **hard version** of this renewal. The peace process, which appears increasingly deadlocked, and the fund scandal

both reinforce indications that there are forces within the system inclined to give the government a radical shake-up.

It should of course also be noted that **Ekrem İmamoğlu** could serve as the reserve option for such a model of renewal.

Another possibility is that a **revolutionary actor**, taking advantage of the narrowing political sphere, pours a far greater force than anything we have witnessed so far onto this decaying social system that itself spreads decay.

Whatever happens, Turkey is now facing a crisis of governance that can no longer be brushed aside or pacified, and the capitalist class is beginning to realise that unless a solution is found, this crisis will become a systemic crisis.

To boil it all down: the issue goes far beyond “*Who should be the candidate, Mansur or Ekrem?*” The foremost task of every revolutionary today is to break society’s habit of viewing the country through the prism of the main opposition. The narrowing of the political sphere must be treated as **an opportunity** to clear the way for real politics.



(1) Özgür Özel: While serving as Chairman of the CHP, Özel was removed from office by a court ruling in 2026, and former chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his leadership team were reinstated in his place. Özel subsequently founded the YENİ Party together with his team and 90 MPs who left the CHP, and became its chairman.

(2) Ekrem İmamoğlu: While serving as Mayor of İstanbul and emerging as one of the strongest potential presidential challengers to Erdoğan, İmamoğlu was detained and arrested in the operation of 19 March 2025 and removed from office. He remains in pre-trial detention in cases the opposition describes as politically motivated interventions.

(3) Mansur Yavaş: Mayor of Ankara. Yavaş resigned from the CHP in September 2026 and announced that he would continue serving as an independent. His name continues to be mentioned among possible candidates in the next presidential election.

(4) Ömer Koç: A leading member of the Koç family, which controls Koç Holding, one of Turkey’s largest capital groups, and Chairman of the holding company’s Board of Directors. In remarks made in September 2026, he strongly criticised Israel and the United States, United Kingdom and European Union for supporting it, while arguing that Turkey could assume a central position in the emerging international order.



The Republic, communists and socialist revolution

Gözde Kök,

Member of TKP Party Council

The Republic and the historical gains associated with its foundation occupy an important place in the political outlook of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP). This position rests, first, on a historical view that recognises the progressive character of the bourgeois revolutions and the significance of their legacy. In the case of Turkey, it can be understood through the particular course of the bourgeois revolution, the fact that this revolution took place in the context of an international revolutionary rupture led by the October Revolution, the emergence of the Turkish communist movement during the same process and its support for the revolution, and the progressive legacy of the Republic being increasingly taken up by the working class and the socialist movement in the class struggles that followed.

1919–1923: The bourgeois revolution and the birth of the communist movement

The period from 1919 to 1923 constituted the final and decisive stage of the bourgeois revolution in

Turkey. The national liberation war against imperialist occupation was combined with the struggle against the political and social forces of the old system. The abolition of the Sultanate and the establishment of the Republic marked a fundamental break with the old system. Despite its bourgeois class character, the Republic represented the most important revolutionary leap in Turkey's history.

The Turkish communist movement was not external to this transformation. On the contrary, it was born under conditions in which the national liberation struggle against imperialism and the fight against the old regime were still under way. When TKP was founded on 10 September 1920 in Baku, communists were already involved in the National Struggle in various parts of the country. Under the leadership of Mustafa Suphi, the party sought to take part in the struggle as an independent political force representing workers and peasants, supporting the national struggle while

organising and working for social emancipation.

Communists did not counterpose national liberation to social emancipation. While fighting for the defeat of imperialist occupation and the dismantling of the old regime, they argued that national liberation had to be completed by social emancipation. This approach showed continuity within the TKP in the periods that followed. Despite all its class limitations, the Republican Revolution was regarded as a historic step forward, while the defence of national independence continued to be one of the communist movement's central fields of struggle. This continuity meant embracing the gains of the Republic without subordinating the communist movement to the bourgeois political leadership, and placing those gains within the perspective of socialist revolution.

The class contradiction of the Republic

The contradiction developed through the revolution itself. As a radical break with the old system, and

in the revolutionary conjuncture of the time, the revolution necessarily brought forth a series of progressive elements. At the same time, as part of that very break, it removed the legal and practical obstacles that had stood in the way of capitalist development. As the bourgeoisie grew and consolidated its position under these new conditions, its drive to keep society under control, integrate more closely with the West and maximise profits increasingly brought it into conflict with values and orientations produced by the revolution itself, including national independence, secularism and the prominent role assigned to the state and the public sector in economic development.

For this reason, the erosion of the Republic's progressive gains is not confined to the recent period. As the capitalist class grew stronger, it increasingly came into conflict with the legacy of the revolution that had brought it into being. The orientations of the founding period, such as independence, secularism, populism, statism and a public-oriented economic approach, a foreign policy that maintained a distance from imperialism, and friendship with the Soviet Union, increasingly became a burden for the capitalist class. Yet this was not a one-sided retreat. As the capitalist class moved away from the Republic's progressive legacy, that

legacy was increasingly taken up by other social forces.

From the 1950s to the 1970s: The Republic's legacy changes hands

In the 1950s, as Turkey's dependence on imperialism rapidly deepened following its recent accession to NATO, the Democrat Party government dealt significant blows to the progressive values and institutions inherited from the founding period of the Republic, while a broad progressive public opinion emerged in opposition to these developments.

But in the 1960s a new element entered the picture. The rapidly developing working-class movement, trade-union organisation, socialist parties and the revolutionary youth movement began to acquire an independent weight in Turkey's political life. One of the most visible expressions of this change was the rise of the Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP), founded by trade unionists in 1961 and soon included prominent socialist intellectuals. At a time when the Communist Party remained banned, TİP openly raised the banner of socialism; its growing social and political influence was reflected, among other things, in its representation in the parliament. This rising socialist movement did not take a hostile position towards the Republic. It incorporated the

Republic's historical gains into its own programme and linked them to the perspective of a more advanced social transformation, namely socialism.

The fascist military coup of 12 September 1980 caused a severe rupture in this development. The violent repression directed against the organised forces of the working-class movement and the revolutionary left did not merely result in organisational destruction; in the aftermath of defeat, a rupture also occurred in the relationship that significant sections of the left had established with the country and with the Republic's historically progressive legacy. In the period that followed, the growing influence of liberal ideology deepened this estrangement further. The rise of the Kurdish movement, particularly from the 1990s onwards, also became an important factor in the ideological and political reorientation of broad sections of the left, intersecting in significant ways with these liberal tendencies. Class analysis was increasingly abandoned in favour of an opposition centred on the authoritarian and repressive character of the state, and for some sections of the left this became the basis for denying the progressive character and historical gains of the Republican Revolution altogether.

The political current from which today's TKP emerged distinguished





itself from this broader ideological and political reorientation of the left. The question of the Republic formed one dimension of this divide. Our movement refused to treat the bourgeois character of the Republic as grounds for dismissing the revolutionary break of 1919–1923.

The long counter-revolutionary process and the Party of Justice and Development (AKP)

This historical trajectory also requires the AKP period, which started in 2002, to be assessed differently. The dismantling of the Republic did not begin with the AKP. The capitalist class's move away from the Republic's progressive legacy was a process that unfolded over decades. AKP rule represented the stage at which this process advanced to the direct dismantling of the Republic's institutions and values. It is insufficient to explain the destruction of the Republic solely in terms of religious reaction, as some Kemalist circles do. The structure that has emerged today, with unfettered market rule, religious reaction, the dismantling of the public sphere and expansionist pursuits within

imperialist competition, has broken significantly with the progressive legacy of the Republic's founding period.

Yet the political and institutional dismantling of the Republic did not erase its historical imprint on society. Broad sections of society in Turkey remain strongly attached to the institutions and values of the Republic that have been dismantled. Many among them now find it difficult to find a suitable and lasting political place for themselves within the existing system.

TKP's relationship with these social sections does not mean adapting to their existing political consciousness. On the contrary, the fundamental issue is to make visible the connection between the destruction of the Republic and the capitalist system. Defending the Republic without questioning capitalism and market rule creates an increasingly evident contradiction. Likewise, when republicanism is combined with a pro-NATO political position, nationalism, hostility towards Kurds or an expansionist conception of a "strong Turkey," it ties the Republic's

progressive legacy to the reactionary political tendencies of the present.

Communist intervention among these sections of society therefore has two dimensions: creating channels for common struggle and organisation with them, while at the same time combating the ideological and political ties that bind them to the capitalist system.

For a socialist republic

The objective here is not to return to 1923. The class and social conditions of Turkey today are different from those of a century ago; the age of bourgeois revolutions has come to an end. The Republic itself has been dismantled, and the political task can no longer be defined in terms of defending it against further destruction. What remains, however, is the deep imprint left on Turkish society.

The task today is to strengthen the call for a new foundation with the socialist character, rooted in equality and freedom, with the working class at its center; it is clear that this is the only way to keep this historical legacy alive.



The fund scandal:

Surplus-value extraction isn't enough for the system of plunder

Gülay Dinçel,

Member of TKP Party Council

At a time when Turkish capitalism is expanding rapidly, profit rates are rising, and working masses are being suppressed, it is also making room for additional mechanisms of plunder. The recent fund scandal is an example of this. A large amount of value was transferred from several hundred thousand workers to capitalists and rentiers.

The 2020-2025 period in Turkey was one of rapid expansion in capital accumulation. The capitalist class, having made good use of pandemic conditions, expanded its opportunities for exploitation enormously. Manufacturing output in 2025 was more than a third higher than before the pandemic. The expansion in manufacturing output, driven by new

opportunities in foreign markets as well as the domestic market, led to a significant rise in the rate of surplus value. Before 2025, the surplus value appropriated in manufacturing industry stood at around 50 billion dollars a year, whereas over 2020-2025 this figure approached 100 billion dollars. While the number of workers rose by 20 percent, the pool of surplus value expanded by more than 100 percent. As the labor force grew across the economy, particularly in manufacturing, real wages fell. Both global developments and the additional opportunism of the Turkish bourgeoisie meant that high price volatility and high inflation created additional mechanisms for reinforcing exploitation. The rapid

depreciation of the lira, high inflation, and high interest rates deepened impoverishment for the working masses, while at the same time increasing their search for ways to protect their savings, however small.

This picture opened up room for new moves centered on capital markets, above all the stock exchange. One dimension of this is the accelerating race among different fractions of capital to claim a share of the expanded pool of surplus value, and the design of new mechanisms for that purpose. But these mechanisms are also built to keep value flowing from millions of workers who are trying to protect their small savings, or who are borrowing in the hope of high returns to ease

their poverty. The political authority and the relevant regulatory bodies supported the creation of these new mechanisms of plunder. Setting aside the new arrangements in the capital markets, the same period also saw a rise in interest in all kinds of betting, gambling and similar activities in Turkey.

What is the fund scandal?

The fund scandal, which emerged at the end of September, became clear when the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (SPK) decided to liquidate 131 investment funds controlled by seven portfolio management companies. It was announced that the value of these funds exceeded 20 billion dollars and that they affected 450,000 investors. Most of the frozen funds consist of hedge funds, while 14 are money market funds or participation money market funds.

The mechanism that enabled the funds to gain value rapidly and become attractive was stock exchange-based. The value of a proportion of the dozens of companies that had undergone initial public offerings in a huge craze was inflated beyond their true worth, and the funds were linked to these shares. Stocks with low liquidity and

low trading volume were overvalued by creating artificial positions. Some of the funds at the center of the crisis, in particular, were limited funds made up of a small number of investors between 2021 and 2025. These funds saw enormous increases during this period. In 2025, small investors in particular showed great interest in the funds, which were opened to other investors on the strength of this high performance. Entry into funds whose value had risen as much as tenfold was encouraged on various platforms. After the SPK defined stricter rules in August 2026, difficulties arose in providing the cash needed to pay investors who wanted their money back. Finally, in September, the funds, which had become unable to pay their debts, were frozen. While small investors were being told in August and September that the funds were very safe, it was established that people who knew the mechanism was unsustainable, who had received inside information, and a significant share of whom had close ties to the government, exited the funds with gains of more than tenfold. One of the most striking examples was Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, a former Minister

of Family and Social Policies and also a Deputy Chair of the AKP. It was revealed that Kaya and her husband invested 3.2 million dollars and made 43.4 million dollars.

Considering the peak value the funds reached with overvalued returns, the size of the financial bubble that has burst exceeds 20 billion dollars. It is claimed that, with systemic effects, this figure could rise to four or five times as much. Given indicators such as Turkey's GDP (1.6 trillion dollars), the total volume of the financial system and the size of the capital markets, it is inevitable for this to impact the economy. However, considering the principal invested in the funds (2-3 billion dollars), the number of investors and the investor profile, the overall impact on the economy is expected to be containable. There are also assessments that the impact on international financial monopolies and major capital groups of Turkish capitalist class remains very limited, and that the crisis, which could be called "home-made," is an intervention aimed at the AKP.

While the owners of the fund management companies were in



close relationships with the AKP government, the regulatory bodies left significant gaps and, in places, turned a blind eye to irregularities. It also emerged that members of the government themselves, above all former ministers and figures in the AKP's top leadership, made substantial gains from the funds. It is clear that this picture is linked to the AKP government's comfort in pushing such mechanisms to limits that are hard to tolerate even under capitalism, and to the fact that significant rent mechanisms have been established in various areas. However, the fact that a risk which everyone, including pro-establishment professionals, had seen and warned about for about a year has materialized in this way is also closely tied to the disarray of the AKP government.

Is the scandal ordinary?

It can be said that the already evident speculative character of the capital markets, above all the stock exchange, was pushed to the limit in a high-volume swindle carried out on a narrow scale, without spreading to a broad base. For in the same period, a major stock market heist also took place, with the permission and the blind eye of the political authority and the bureaucracy. Through the new IPOs mentioned above, millions of small investors (nearly 6 million) were drawn into the stock exchange, and their savings were transferred to the capitalist class. But because it unfolded across a much broader base and over a longer period, it drew less attention and gave rise to fewer complaints. It was normalized within the stock market "logic."

Similar scandals are taking place in capitalist countries at every level of development, both historically

and today. Capitalism is a system of plunder, and with capital markets designed precisely for this purpose now so highly developed, it cannot avoid crises of this kind. On the contrary, newer and more creative methods keep being found. That such a scandal has surfaced in Turkish capitalism, where far more sophisticated and well-concealed mechanisms exist across the financial system as a whole, is ordinary when considered in terms of the tendencies of the capitalist order. But it is not ordinary when one considers the structure of Turkish capitalism and the quantitative and qualitative level of development of its capital markets. In Turkey, the establishment have long been keen on "developing and deepening the capital markets". In this way, the AKP government would be able to both provide new opportunities for the capitalist class and create new rent mechanisms for its own circle. However, despite a history spanning over 40 years, capital markets in Turkey remain shallow and constitute a significant barrier to the realisation of the ambition mentioned above. The financial sector is dominated by the banking sector, and banking industry also have a strong influence over the capital markets. The capital hierarchy taking into account the structure of Turkey's capitalist class and the inclusion of international capital, is a significant barrier to design the sort of sophisticated mechanisms—of the kind upon which the fund scandal was built. Indeed, it appears that the mechanism at the heart of the fund scandal was itself based on very flimsy foundations. That it was not defused earlier and more quietly appears to be largely related to tensions within the establishment in Turkey.

Capital markets are shallow; banks dominate the financial system

In Turkey, the financial system is controlled by the banking sector. Despite the inflated growth in Borsa Istanbul (stock exchange) and portfolio investments in recent years, the share of the capital markets in both the financial system and GDP remains relatively low. If government bonds and corporate bond issuances are set aside (technically regarded as capital market instruments, but under the control of the state, the banks and large capital groups), the share of instruments such as equity markets and investment funds in the total financial system is limited, despite the stimulated growth of recent years. The bank-dominated structure of the financial system is related to the way Turkish capitalism is integrated with international capital, and to the structure and preferences of the capitalist class.

While the share of the world's ten largest stock exchanges in GDP exceeds 100 percent, for Turkey this ratio was around 25 percent in 2025. In the US, Nasdaq's market capitalization is 122 percent of US GDP, while the same ratio for the New York Stock Exchange is around 102 percent. For Euronext, which covers major European economies, it exceeds 140 percent. Likewise, the number of listed companies on the ten largest exchanges ranges between 2,000 and 6,000, whereas in Turkey this number stood at 569 at the end of 2025, despite the IPO frenzy of the last five years. The picture is weaker still for investment funds. At the end of 2025, the securities investment portfolio in Turkey was 11 percent of GDP. The same ratio is 145.5 percent for the US and 94.8 percent for France.



Fund Scandal in Turkey




242 FIRMS

Between 2020 and August 2026, 242 companies joined capital markets by launching initial public offerings (IPOs) on the İstanbul Stock Exchange. Considering the 569 companies listed on the İstanbul Stock Exchange as of September 2026, the companies that went public during this period account for approximately 42.5% of total listed companies. The total proceeds generated from the IPOs of these companies amount to approximately \$12 billion.

5,7 MILLION

Between August 2020 and August 2026, approximately 5.7 million new investors joined the İstanbul Stock Exchange. However, the share of the 242 companies in question within the İstanbul Stock Exchange's total market capitalization stands at approximately 10–12%.




18%

While household financial assets rose from \$476 billion in 2021 to \$632 billion in 2025, the share of investment funds within these assets increased from 5% to 18% in the same period. Consequently, investment funds became an increasingly important investment vehicle for household financial savings. Meanwhile, total assets held by individual investors in investment funds reached approximately \$35 billion.

50 THOUSAND

Approximately 60% of investment funds are controlled by around 50,000 individuals who possess capital, derive rent income, or belong to the high-income bracket. This indicates not only the proliferation of investment funds but also the concentration of ownership regarding financial assets.





From the October Revolution to Ankara: The Bolshevik Peace Policy and the War of Independence

Ogün Eratalay,
Member of TKP Party Council

The October Revolution did not merely change the ruling power in Russia; it also shook the world order the imperialist powers sought to impose after the First World War. The Bolshevik withdrawal from the war and their immediate repudiation of Tsarist Russia's partition plans for Ottoman territories opened a new international frontier for Turkey. The developing relations between Ankara and Moscow influenced the diplomatic, military, and economic conditions of the War of Independence. During this same period, a significant section of European social democracy failed to develop an independent line from the imperialist centers in the face of the "Eastern Question."

From the very outbreak of the First World War, Tsarist Russia had been

actively bargaining with Britain and France over the partition of Ottoman territories. Istanbul and the Straits had long been primary targets of the Tsarist regime's expansionist policy. The secret treaties drafted during the war laid out exactly how the imperialist powers intended to carve up the Ottoman Empire, with the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement standing as the most notorious example. The October Revolution shattered this equation. Upon seizing power, the Bolsheviks did not merely advocate for their country's withdrawal from the war; they took direct aim at the secret diplomacy and imperialist partition treaties of the Tsarist era. In doing so, the young Soviet power declared a decisive break from the foreign policy legacy of the old Russian state. For Turkey, this

rupture would yield highly concrete consequences.

The Bolsheviks' immediate tasks: Ending the war and the system of secret diplomacy

The Decree on Peace, issued by the Bolsheviks upon taking power, called on all belligerent parties to conclude a peace without annexations or indemnities. Subsequently, a decision was made to publish the secret treaties concluded by the Tsarist governments. The release of these documents in *Izvestia* between November 23–25, 1917, laid bare the imperialist powers' wartime bargaining and partition schemes. By repudiating these treaties, the Bolsheviks made it clear that Russia would no longer pursue the Tsarist policy of

partitioning Ottoman lands.

To halt the advance of the German Empire, the Soviet power signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 3 1918, officially withdrawing from the war. Under the treaty, Russian forces pulled back to their pre-war borders, ending the Russian military presence in Eastern Anatolia. Thus, while the war on the eastern front ended for the Ottoman Empire, Russia was no longer aligned with Britain and France in the scramble to carve up Ottoman territory.

Russia's withdrawal altered the equation in Anatolia

The October Revolution and Russia's withdrawal from the imperialist partition plans catalyzed an international transformation that directly affected Turkey's future. By the end of 1918, as the Ottoman Empire emerged defeated from the war, the Entente Powers began to establish increasingly broader control over Anatolia and Ottoman territories following the Armistice of Mudros.

The Kuvayı Milliye ("National Forces") movement, which emerged in Anatolia in opposition to the occupation and the collaborationist Sultanate, was fighting against Britain, France, Greece, and other Entente powers while simultaneously striving to break out of its international isolation. Moscow, meanwhile, was navigating a period in which the imperialist powers were attempting to encircle the fledgling workers' state. Though the political and ideological objectives of Ankara and Moscow differed, the international balance of power they faced created a basis for cooperation between the two sides.

Initial contacts between Ankara and Moscow

Following the Mudros Armistice, the Entente's occupation of Istanbul and the capitulation of the capital's ruling elite shifted the political center of the Anatolian resistance to Ankara. As the government of the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) emerged as a new seat of political power, one of the fundamental challenges it faced was securing international recognition and support.

Throughout 1920, diplomatic contacts between Ankara and Soviet Russia intensified. Ankara

was searching not only for military aid from the Soviets but also for a new international counterweight against the pressure of the Entente Powers. Moscow, for its part, viewed the Anatolian movement as a crucial factor in countering the influence of imperialist powers—particularly Britain—in the Caucasus and the Black Sea region. This bedrock of mutual interest between two parties with different ultimate goals paved the way to the 1921 Treaty of Moscow.

Moscow's support: Weapons, gold, and diplomacy

One of the most debated aspects of Soviet support was military and economic aid. For Ankara, which was facing severe resource shortages under war conditions, this assistance was vital. However, reducing this support merely to shipments of weapons and gold would be a mistake. Soviet Russia's recognition of Ankara as a counterpart and the establishment of diplomatic relations not only bolstered the international standing of the Grand National Assembly government but also opened a distinct international channel against the Istanbul government.

1921: A new era in Ankara-Moscow relations

By 1921, the political and military conditions had shifted considerably. As the civil war in Soviet Russia was largely coming to an end, the Sovietization of the Caucasus had been completed with the indirect support of the Ankara government. Relations between Ankara and Moscow also settled onto a more stable foundation. The Treaty of Moscow, signed on March 16, 1921, established the fundamental framework for this new era. Later that year, on October 13, the Treaty of Kars—signed between the Ankara government and Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—reaffirmed the principles agreed upon in Moscow. Thus, the eastern borders of the new Turkey were largely finalized.

The Treaty of Moscow was not merely a border agreement. It also stipulated that the issue of the Straits would be resolved at a conference attended by Black Sea littoral states and that Turkey's sovereignty would be respected. This approach stood

in clear contrast to the arrangement envisaged for Turkey by the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. The treaty between Soviet Russia and Ankara thus emerged as a pillar of international relations actively resisting the Sèvres order.

The view of European social democracy on the "Eastern Question" and the Bolshevik difference

When evaluating the Bolsheviks' approach to Turkey, it is also necessary to take into account the stance of European social democracy. Since the late 19th century, the European socialist movement had intensely debated the "Eastern Question"—focusing on the future of the Ottoman Empire, national movements in the Balkans, and the interventions of the Great Powers in the region.

European social democracy did not possess a single, unwavering line on this issue. There was also a strong current that opposed the partition of Ottoman territories by the great powers. Indeed, the 1912 Basel Socialist Congress warned that the partition of the Balkans and Ottoman territories would lead to new wars and called for a struggle against the European states' policies of conquest in Anatolia.

However, when the war erupted in 1914, a significant portion of the social democratic parties that were members of the Second International supported their governments' war policies, contradicting their previous internationalist resolutions. The contradiction between the international solidarity of the working class and the imperial interests of nation-states was thus laid bare.

The Bolsheviks' stance diverged precisely on this point. Lenin and the Bolsheviks viewed the war as a war of partition among imperialist states and argued that the working classes must fight against their own governments. Following the October Revolution, this approach was also reflected in the policies of the new Soviet government.

This divergence was not merely about foreign policy preferences. The Bolsheviks understood imperialism as the consequence of the economic and political struggle for dominance



The Treaty of Moscow was signed on 16 March 1921.

among capitalist states, and they viewed national liberation movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries as integral components of the global revolutionary strategy. Conversely, a significant portion of European social democracy failed to break away from the policies of their own states during the war. This distinction took on concrete significance when it came to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the partition of Anatolia.

Ankara's rapprochement with Moscow threw a wrench into the West's plans

The growing alignment between Ankara and Moscow actively disrupted the Entente Powers' designs for Turkey. While Ankara expanded its military capacity, it was also forging international relations, and its treaties with Soviet Russia systematically strengthened its geopolitical position. As the conflicting interests among the Entente Powers themselves became more pronounced, enforcing the order dictated by Sèvres became

increasingly difficult.

It is impossible to attribute the success of the War of Independence to a single external source of support. The military struggle in Anatolia, mass social mobilization, the organization of the TBMM, and the formation of a regular army were the fundamental dynamics that determined the outcome of the war. Yet, the international conditions under which this struggle was waged cannot be ignored. The October Revolution radically transformed these conditions. The abandonment of Tsarist Russia's imperial ambitions regarding Ottoman territories and the subsequent establishment of relations between Ankara and Moscow opened up a new international realm for Turkey.

This picture also revealed another dimension of the rift that materialized during the war years between the Bolsheviks and European social democracy. Europe's social democratic parties did not uniformly

approach the struggle in Anatolia; however, it cannot be said that they explicitly embraced and supported this movement as a national liberation struggle. The Bolsheviks' stance was different in this regard. While acting in accordance with its own political objectives, Soviet Russia unequivocally sided with the Anatolian struggle, concretizing this support through diplomatic recognition, military and financial aid, and political cooperation.

Therefore, the significance of the October Revolution for the Turkish War of Independence cannot be measured solely in the shipments of weapons and gold sent to Ankara. The more fundamental change was the demise of a Tsarist Russia seeking to partition Turkey and its replacement by a new political power willing and able to cooperate with Ankara against the post-war imperialist order. It is here that the true historical bond between the October Revolution and the Turkish War of Independence must be sought



A struggle for workers' unity, standing up to the bosses

Selahattin Kural ,
Member of TKP Central Committee

Workers in Turkey are struggling to make ends meet under working and living conditions that are becoming harsher by the day. Wages are eroding, working conditions are deteriorating, and job security is disappearing. Employers, meanwhile, draw strength from workers' lack of organization, turning violations of workers' rights into the norm. Unpaid wages, the denial of severance and notice pay, undeclared employment, long working hours, and insecurity are no longer exceptions.

It is precisely in such a period that it is crucial for workers to reach out to one another, to recognize that they are not alone, and to stand together in the struggle for their rights.

Breath Down the Neck of the Bosses (PE) communication, solidarity and struggle network has brought to light numerous encouraging examples in recent months through

workers' struggles in different cities. In İstanbul, İzmir, Trabzon, Gaziantep and Sakarya, workers have come together through PE's solidarity networks and are fighting for their rights. In some of these cases, workers have won their demands. The struggle of construction workers in Sakarya, who waged a determined and organized campaign, won their rights, and subsequently joined the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), has been an important experience.

A 14-Day struggle for rights at the construction site

Workers employed on a public construction project in Sakarya staged a 14-day protest after failing to receive the wages they were owed. Three days of the protest were spent on the roof of the construction site. In the end, the workers secured all of their rights from the employer.

This was not an ordinary private-

sector construction site. The project was the construction of the Sakarya Provincial Police Department's new service building. Although the workers were employed by a subcontractor working for İlgazlar İnşaat, the main contractor responsible for the project, the actual owner of the construction was the Ministry of Interior. Consequently, the Ministry of Interior bears responsibility for all of the workers' rights.

Twenty-six workers who had been employed on the project's mechanical installation works reached out to PE and began organizing to fight for their rights. Together with representatives of PE and the Sakarya Provincial Organization of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), they drew up an action plan. As the workers' struggle grew, so did the pressure on the employer. The employer repeatedly requested meetings. The Provincial Police Chief

and the Governor of Sakarya also became involved in the process. The workers' determination unsettled not only the employer but also the public authorities.

Throughout the struggle, demonstrations were held in central Sakarya. The injustices faced by the workers were brought to the attention of the public. The employer's previous violations of workers' rights, the public tenders it had been awarded, and its treatment of workers were brought into the public spotlight.

The employer is the owner of a construction company that has grown through government contracts, withheld workers' rights, and forced workers to work under degrading and unhealthy conditions. In this way, he has filled his coffers with public funds and the labor of workers.

That is why the issue is not simply about a few workers failing to receive the wages they are owed. The issue is that withholding workers' rightful compensation is increasingly becoming normalized among employers. If employers set their sights on workers' rights, workers can also expose employers' opportunism, hostility toward workers, and theft to society at large.

In the end, the employer could not withstand the pressure any longer and was forced to back down. The workers stood their ground—and they won.

From the struggle for wages to organized political struggle

What makes the struggle in Sakarya significant is not simply that the workers received the wages they were owed. What is truly important is that it provides concrete evidence that

organized struggle can achieve results in the face of employers.

Throughout the struggle, the Sakarya Provincial Organization of the Communist Party of Turkey also stood alongside the workers. It showed solidarity with them at every stage and worked to strengthen the struggle and make the workers' situation known to the local community. When the employer stopped providing meals for the workers, people from Sakarya came to show their support.

In this way, the workers did more than simply fight for their rights. They also experienced what it means to stand together in the face of an employer.

This experience is also significant in establishing a connection between economic demands and political struggle. Of course, this did not happen spontaneously. TKP members who had been fighting alongside the workers from the very beginning of the protest played a role in this transformation. As a concrete step in this direction, on the day the struggle ended in victory, all of the workers applied for membership in TKP. That day was also September 10, when we celebrated the 106th anniversary of TKP's founding.

They moved from an economic struggle to participation in the political struggle of the working class. In this way, an everyday struggle over wages opened the door to a broader class struggle.

Construction workers: Migration, insecurity and exploitation

The story of the workers in Sakarya also sheds light on the working conditions faced by a significant

proportion of construction workers in Turkey.

Construction is one of the sectors where Kurdish workers are heavily represented. The vast majority of the workers who took part in the struggle in Sakarya are Kurdish workers who live in Iğdır and are related to one another. They spend approximately four to five months of the year in other cities, working at construction sites. During the remaining months, they return to their hometowns. They are paid on a daily-wage basis and are often left without social security coverage, or their social security contributions are paid based on the minimum wage.

Being away from their hometowns, living apart from their families, working under temporary arrangements, and often not staying at the same construction site for long periods all make it difficult for workers to organize. Employers take full advantage of this fragmentation of the working class, turning this working arrangement into an opportunity to serve their own interests.

In the past, workers fought to shorten working hours, increase wages, and expand social rights. Today, however, many workers are fighting simply to receive the wages they are entitled to after doing their work.

This situation is particularly pronounced in the construction sector. At many construction sites, workers go months without receiving their wages. Employers sometimes hide behind the excuse that they have "no money," sometimes shut down their companies, sometimes use family connections to their advantage,



and sometimes simply disappear without paying what they owe their workers.

Employers draw strength from one another. The silence of workers, meanwhile, only emboldens employers to intensify their attacks. This is why it is more important than ever for workers to draw strength from one another's struggles.

Breath Down the Neck of the Bosses (PE): A communication, solidarity and struggle network

PE emerged precisely in such a period.

Founded in 2018, at a time when the economic crisis was deepening and employers were using the crisis as a pretext to intensify attacks on workers' rights, **PE** developed as a means of struggle through which workers could make the injustices they faced known, build solidarity with one another, and fight together.

The fundamental strength of **PE** lies in the fact that it does not view the problems workers face merely as individual cases of "victimization." When a worker's wages are withheld, it is not simply that worker's problem. When a worker seeking to unionize at a factory is subjected to pressure, it is not merely the concern of the workers at that factory. When workers' wages are withheld at a construction site, it is part of an attack faced by the working class as a whole.

For this reason, while making workers' problems visible, **PE** also calls on them to join together in collective struggle.

There have been numerous examples of this in recent months.

In İstanbul, Panista Bakery workers have been fighting for months after being denied unpaid wages and severance pay as a result of the company's fraudulent bankruptcy. In Trabzon, Kurdish construction workers employed at a public housing construction site organized through **PE** and won their rights after a three-day protest. In İzmir, Carrefour workers achieved results through their struggle after their wages were withheld.

The struggle of textile workers in İzmir producing for Tommy Hilfiger is ongoing. At the İzmir Metropolitan

Municipality, subcontracted workers who previously fought together through **PE** and secured gains over unpaid wages are now continuing their struggle for permanent employment.

In Araban, Gaziantep, workers employed on earthquake-housing projects have been demonstrating outside the Provincial Directorate of the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change because they have not received their wages. They are preparing to take their struggle to Ankara.

The experience of workers at the Xiaomi warehouse in Esenyurt, İstanbul, meanwhile, illustrates another dimension of organizing. Before seeking to unionize, the workers first established a solidarity network among warehouse workers. Once nearly all of the workers at the workplace had joined the network, they collectively joined a union and enabled the union to obtain official recognition at the workplace.

This example does not diminish the importance of trade unions for workers; on the contrary, it demonstrates that trade-union struggle must be grounded in the genuine organization of workers. A form of unionism in which workers do not exercise their own collective power and compromise with the employer becomes the primary method that must be confronted with the direct, organized power of workers themselves.

From identity to class: Unity against employers

The struggle of the Kurdish construction workers in Sakarya opens another important door in this respect.

The Kurdish bourgeoisie continues to grow and expand across the country and the region, receiving government contracts and establishing subcontracting companies. In doing so, it also exploits the labor of Kurdish workers, regardless of ethnic identity.

For Kurdish workers employed in the construction sector, identity is, of course, an important part of life. Yet when it comes to the relationship between the worker and the employer, the worker's position reveals the same class reality regardless of their

identity: the worker who sells their labor and the employer who profits from that labor.

This situation is widespread in construction, textiles, and the service sector. In many construction sites, textile workshops, cafés, and restaurants, Kurdish workers fail to receive their due from Kurdish employers. For employers, what comes first is not identity, but the fullness of their coffers.

The workers who fought together in Sakarya experienced the concrete meaning of solidarity. The point here is not to ignore identities, but to prevent differences in identity from being placed above the common class interests of workers.

Hope lies in workers making plans against employers' plans

Today, the cost of living and poverty are growing. While a small minority is becoming wealthier, the future of millions of workers is becoming increasingly insecure. Employers draw strength from unorganized workers.

What workers need in response is not passive or merely reactive action. They need real, concrete struggles that achieve results.

We need to multiply examples in which workers who stand their ground win their rights, as in Sakarya; secure gains within three days, as in Trabzon; and achieve results by acting together, as in İzmir. But the real issue is that these struggles must not end once gains have been achieved.

The unity that emerges during workers' protests must be transformed into lasting organization. Economic struggle must not be separated from political struggle. Because the problem facing workers is not simply an individual employer. It is the system itself, which treats workers' labor as a commodity to be exploited.

This is precisely why **PE** is a means of struggle that enables workers to learn about one another's struggles, build solidarity, and fight together.

What needs to be done today is clear: workers must strengthen their unity in the face of employers' attacks and begin making their own plans in response to the plans of employers.

Highlights from Turkish Foreign Policy



Integration into the regional war order

Recent developments in Turkey's foreign policy have once again raised questions about Ankara's claim that it pursues an independent and balanced policy in the Middle East. While the AKP government presents Turkey as a country capable of maintaining relations with competing powers and acting as a mediator in regional conflicts, its recent decisions point to a growing alignment with the political and military framework established by the United States and its allies.

Two developments in September illustrate this contradiction particularly clearly. Turkey's three largest airlines suspended flights to Iran amid a tightening US sanctions regime targeting the Iranian aviation sector. At almost the same time, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced that Turkey could meet

Saudi Arabia's military needs in the context of the war in Yemen.

These developments came shortly after the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) warned against Turkey becoming directly involved in the war against Yemen alongside Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States. For TKP, these are not isolated decisions but part of a broader foreign policy orientation that increasingly ties Turkey to imperialist alliances and conflicts.

From "balance" to concrete commitments

The Turkish government has for years emphasized that Ankara follows a "balanced" foreign policy in the Middle East. This approach has often been presented as evidence of Turkey's ability to maintain relations with countries on opposing sides of regional conflicts while protecting its own interests.

Yet the recent developments make the limits of this narrative increasingly visible.

On 21 September, Turkish Airlines (THY), Pegasus and AJet suspended their flights to Iran. According to soL Haber, the decision came shortly after the US Treasury announced new sanctions against Iran's aviation sector on 8 September, targeting 36 individuals and entities. The Iranian airline Mahan Air also reportedly suspended flights from Istanbul and Ankara under the pressure created by US sanctions.

The timing is significant because Iran has been a central target of the US and Israeli campaign in the region. Restrictions on aviation are not simply technical or commercial measures when they form part of a wider effort to isolate a country economically and restrict its international connections.

Turkey is, of course, a NATO member and has extensive military and political relations with Washington. Nevertheless, the AKP government continues to present its foreign policy as if Turkey stood outside the confrontation between the US-led bloc and its regional opponents.

The flight suspensions raise a more concrete question: how far can Ankara distance itself from Washington's regional policy while simultaneously implementing measures that contribute to the isolation of Iran?

Yemen: a new test for Ankara

The question became even sharper with the statements of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan regarding Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

On 19 September, Fidan said that Saudi Arabia could face military needs as a result of attacks by Yemen's Ansarullah movement and stated that Turkey would have no problem meeting such needs, particularly in technical areas. He referred to the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in August. Under the agreement, an armed attack against one of the parties is considered an attack against all three.

The statement represents

a significant shift in tone when compared with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's own words in 2019. At that time, Erdoğan criticised Saudi Arabia over the destruction caused by the war in Yemen, asking: "Saudi Arabia, you must first answer for all this."

TKP recalled this contradiction in its 21 September statement on the Yemen conflict. The party argued that the government was now prepared to cooperate militarily with the same Saudi Arabia whose role in Yemen Erdoğan had previously condemned.

TKP also challenged the legal and political basis for Turkey's possible involvement, arguing that the Mecca Agreement had not even been brought before the Turkish parliament. Its statement concluded with a direct warning: "You will not drag our country into Saudi Arabia's inhumane, illegal war of occupation in Yemen."

For TKP, the issue was therefore not simply whether Turkey would provide military equipment or technical assistance to Saudi Arabia. The broader question was whether Turkey was being drawn into a regional war alongside powers whose interests are closely connected with the US and Israel. Developments in early October gave this warning a more concrete basis.

From military cooperation to deployment preparations

On 8 October, Turkey's Ministry of National Defence confirmed preparations to deploy military forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia, stating that the process would be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and relevant legislation. The announcement followed a 5 October meeting of the Mecca Alliance in Riyadh, where Turkey and Pakistan agreed to rapidly deploy military forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia.

In response, TKP issued a statement titled "No to War", warning that the country was being drawn into a dangerous military confrontation without regard for the will of the people.

"War is war. If Turkey targets another country today with its intelligence, its military equipment or its own armed forces, tomorrow we will become the target." the statement warned.

TKP argued that the Mecca Alliance operated in line with US regional priorities and that Turkey's involvement carried risks extending beyond the war in Yemen. The party called for withdrawal from both the Mecca Agreement and NATO, declaring its opposition to the war and the government's attempts to justify it.



New book from Terkoğlu and Okuyan



What's the Point of Being a Communist?, a book prepared by journalist and author Barış Terkoğlu based on his interview with Kemal Okuyan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), has been published. The book follows *The Republic and the Communists*, published last year based on Haluk Hepkon's interview with Okuyan. It brings together questions about the past and the future, politics in Turkey and around the world, along with candid assessments of TKP's political position, analyses and current outlook.

Following the book's launch, public events were held in İstanbul and Ankara with the participation of Okuyan and Terkoğlu. The talks opened with a discussion of how the book was conceived and why it was needed, and continued with Okuyan's remarks on the book and current political developments. Assessing today's social system, Okuyan said:

"Today we face a social system that has reached a dead end, and the one and only alternative to this system is communism. This system is rotting and collapsing. We are fighting so that we are not buried under this collapse and so that we can build a new life. That is why communism is as necessary as air and water."

Okuyan also argued that socialism is an urgent necessity, pointing to the extent of impoverishment in Turkey:

"As for the impasse of the current system, the system we call capitalism: it has reached a dead end, and it did so long ago. It is rotting and collapsing. Right now, the world is crying out for socialism. The Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, and in these 35 years capitalism has not offered humanity a single good day. The total credit card debt of our citizens in Turkey is 3.5 trillion liras. With such a burden of debt, you can hold people captive. But sooner or later, people will say, 'Enough is enough.' People do not say 'enough' because they have become conscious; they say it and rise up when there is no other way left. If this moment of social rupture does not encounter a program with a clear direction, it may instead end in disaster. Hitler led Germany into darkness by channeling society's feeling of 'enough is enough' in the wrong direction. It was then left to the communists to save humanity from fascism. Communism is also necessary so that humanity never again has to face such an experience of fascism."

The events held for the book also attracted considerable interest, and the book reached its third printing within a week.

TKP marks 106th anniversary



TKP members and friends came together across the country to mark the Party's 106th anniversary, with major events held in Ankara, İzmir and İstanbul. At the event in İzmir, TKP General Secretary Kemal Okuyan welcomed new members into the Party and presented them with their Party badges following his speech.

In Sakarya, one of Turkey's major industrial centers, construction workers who had been fighting for their rights with the support of TKP's workers' solidarity network, "Breathe Down the Bosses' Neck," won their struggle after securing their demands. On the Party's 106th anniversary, the workers came together at the local Party office and applied for membership in TKP.

TKP responds to retirees' protest: "The most painful summary of a rotten system"

Retirees took to the streets in Ankara, Turkey's capital, to say that they can no longer make ends meet. The Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) also joined the retirees at the protest held in front of the Constitutional Court. During the "We Cannot Make Ends Meet" protest outside the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey, a pensioner attempted to take his own life and died.

There are 12.3 million people receiving old-age pensions in Turkey. Over the years, pensions have been eroded by inflation, while demands for flat-rate increases have gone unanswered. In the first eight months of 2026 alone, at least 108 retirees and workers over the age of 65 lost their lives in work-related incidents. Behind the conditions that have pushed millions of pensioners below the hunger line are the government's austerity policies and the resources transferred to the bosses.

Following the incident outside the Constitutional Court, TKP issued a statement criticizing the government's economic policies and describing what happened as "the most painful summary of a rotten system." The Party called on people to stand shoulder to shoulder and announced another protest for the following day. Those who gathered at TKP's call raised their voices for a humane life. At the protest, retirees denounced pensions that remain below the hunger line and reminded the AKP government, which claims that there are "no resources," of the incentives and public funds transferred to the bosses.

TKP in workers' struggles

Workers from several sectors have turned to the Breathe Down the Bosses' Neck Communication, Struggle and Solidarity Network (PE), as struggles over unpaid wages and denied rights continue across Turkey.

Construction workers in Trabzon win their unpaid wages

In Trabzon, construction workers employed at a TOKİ (Housing Development Administration of Turkey) housing site contacted PE after going unpaid for two months. The workers continued their struggle together with PE, while local authorities also became involved in negotiations with the employer. The struggle ended in victory, with the workers receiving all of their unpaid wages.

Earthquake housing workers in Gaziantep join PE

In Gaziantep's Araban district, workers employed in the construction of earthquake housing projects under the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change have been waiting for months to receive wages and other entitlements owed to them and have now joined forces with PE in their struggle.

Atamay workers take their struggle to Tommy Hilfiger stores in three major cities

In İzmir, workers at Atamay Tekstil, a subcontractor of Yeşim Tekstil producing for Tommy Hilfiger, have renewed their struggle over unpaid wages, severance and notice compensation, and other outstanding payments. A previous struggle by workers at the same factory, carried out together with PE, ended with 34 workers receiving all the payments owed to them. A second group of workers, however, remained unpaid and joined the PE Textile Workers' Solidarity Network to continue the struggle.

On October 4, the workers took their protest to Tommy Hilfiger stores in Turkey's three largest cities. Simultaneous protests were held outside the Tommy Hilfiger stores at İstinyePark in İzmir, Cevahir Mall in İstanbul and Armada Mall in Ankara.

At the Ankara protest, PE representative İter Arslaner said that Atamay had shut down the factory claiming there was no work, leaving workers without their wages and compensation. He said the workers had made a commitment to fight for what they were owed and would continue to do so until that commitment was fulfilled.

In İstanbul, protesters gathered outside the Tommy Hilfiger store at Cevahir Mall. Speaking on behalf of PE, Mert Doğan said that the workers had produced the clothes sold by the brand but had still not received what they were owed. He announced that the protests would continue at Tommy Hilfiger stores until the workers received their unpaid wages and compensation.

The workers say they will continue their struggle until all outstanding payments are made.



Carrefour workers protest over unpaid wages

Carrefour store workers who had not received their wages also turned to PE, and a protest was held in front of the branch where they worked.

İzmir Metropolitan Municipality workers continue their protest

Meanwhile, subcontracted workers at İzmir Metropolitan Municipality have continued their protest for 45 days, with PE standing alongside the workers in their struggle for their rights.

International solidarity with the Communist Party of Israel

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkey sent a solidarity message to the Communist Party of Israel following the decision to exclude the Joint List, which includes the Communist Party of Israel and Hadash, from the elections. TKP stated that barring Hadash or Ofer Cassif from the elections would not prevent their struggle. "The Communist Party of Israel will continue its determined struggle under all circumstances," the message said, adding that the Communist Party of Turkey will always stand alongside the Communist Party of Israel.

Joint Statement from TKP and KKE



The Communist Party of Turkey and the Communist Party of Greece issued a joint [statement](#) on recent developments in Greek-Turkish relations. The statement warned that imperialist wars and plans in Ukraine and the Persian Gulf are triggering a worrying chain reaction in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean and relations between the two countries.

Kemal Okuyan's Revolution published in Spanish

Revolution, a book by Kemal Okuyan, TKP General Secretary, has been translated into Spanish and published by the publishing house Tinta Roja through cooperation between the TKP and the Communist Party of the Workers of Spain (PCTE).

The book examines the conditions that make revolution possible and the role of political parties in carrying it through.

Originally published by Yazılama Publishing in 2025, the book is now approaching the end of its sixth print run in Turkey. It has also been published in English and in German, while Portuguese and Russian editions are being prepared for publication.

The Spanish edition will be presented at an event with the participation of Kemal Okuyan in Madrid on Saturday, 17 October.

