Tudeh Party of Iran, "War Profiteers" and the Need to Achieve a Lasting Peace!

6/23/26, 3:44 PM
  • Iran, Tudeh Party of Iran En Asia Communist and workers' parties

"War Profiteers" and the Need to Achieve a Lasting Peace!

 

 

Monday22nd June 2026

 

Editorial of Nameh Mardom, Central Organ of the Tudeh Party of Iran, Issue 1262, 15 June 2026 

On Sunday, 14thof June, the world's mass media announced that the framework of a general agreement between the Islamic Republic and the Trump administration to end the months-long war had been reached, and that negotiations to reach a final agreement on other remaining issues would begin with the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. 

In Iran’s contemporary history, there has rarely been a period when the country has been in such a state of suspense and uncertainty. Although an initial agreement (MoU) has been reached today, there is still a long way to go before a lasting peace can be achieved to protect Iran’s national interests. Iran is still neither at war nor in a lasting peace; it is not on the path to reform, and there are no signs of the regime’s imminent collapse. The society, economy, and politics are in a state that can be called a “political limbo”. Clear examples of the internal conflicts among the government’s own forces in the post-Ali Khamenei era, the unclear status of the newly appointed “Supreme Leader”, and the escalation of conflicts over reaching an agreement with the Trump administration, or maintaining the “no war, no peace” conditions desired by the leadership of the IRGC and the regime’s security and judicial apparatus, indicate a situation in which everyone talks about the crisis, but no one offers a clear perspective for exiting from it. 

In recent weeks, we have witnessed the escalation of dangerous military conflicts that could reignite a full-scale war against Iran. First, there was Israel’s criminal aggression on Lebanese territory, which was a clear violation of the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. This was followed by Iran’s retaliatory missile attack on Israel in defenceof the Lebanese Hezbollah. Then the criminal and racist Israeli regime bombed Iranian cities. And finally, we witnessed the widespread aggression of US imperialism on Iranian soil, bombing several cities in the country and targeting the country’s economic and civil infrastructure. One of them was the American airstrike in the “Bemani” region of Sirik County in Hormozgan Province, during which two drinking water reservoirs were destroyed, leaving at least 20,000 residents of the region facing a definitive water crisis. According to some legal and military experts, the destruction of ordinary people’s drinking water reservoirs is an example of a “war crime.” 

In the midst of these clashes, after the Islamic Republic’s retaliatory attacks on US bases in the region, Trump threatened to attack Iran much harder and seize Iran’s oil resources, including Kharg Island. Trump’s outrageous remarks exposed the aggressive nature of US imperialism to the judgment of world public opinion even more than before. However, after the world expressed concern and condemned Trump’s position, and considering the adverse consequences that the long-term closure of the Strait of Hormuz would have had for the world economy, including the United States itself, Trump, claiming that the leaders of the Islamic Republic had been in contact with him and were serious about peace, announced that the principles of a general agreement or understanding with the Islamic Republic to end the war had been finalized and that an agreement or memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the two countries would be signed soon. 

The events of recent months have shown once again that the Islamic Republic is facing a series of internal and external challenges, each of which alone can endanger the stability of the ruling political system. However, what today, along with the external threat, seriously challenges the ruling regime is the internal situation of the country. Iran's economy is going through one of the most difficult periods. Chronic inflation, devaluation of the national currency, increase in poverty and unemployment, and the spread of social inequality have had a negative impact on the daily lives of millions of hard-working Iranians. The concern of many families is to provide and secure the minimum necessities of life for survival. 

In such circumstances, the resumption of social and trade union protests in recent days was not far-fetched. Workers, pensioners, and high-school students have once again taken to the streets to protest the state of their wages, working (and education) conditions, and livelihoods. Although these protests have not yet turned into a nationwide and coordinated movement, their persistence and expansion show that social dissatisfaction with the anti-people theocratic regime has not only not diminished, but has become embedded in the fabric of society. 

The important point is that a lot of these protests are no longer motivated by purely economic demands. Behind the demands for higher wages or improved social services is a deep distrust in the ability of the ruling political system to solve the country’s problems. The situation is no different in the arena of foreign policy. The strategy of the so-called “active resistance,” which had been the basis of the Islamic Republic’s regional policy in recent years, is now facing serious doubts. The regime continues to emphasize on maintaining its regional influence and deterrence power, but the economic and political costs of this approach have been increasingly criticised and questioned. Although the military conflicts with Israel have at times stirred nationalist sentiments in some sections of society, this has not, on the whole, reduced the crisis of public acceptance and legitimacy for the regime. 

In recent weeks, we have also witnessed the spread of serious signs of disagreement and division at various levels of the ruling circles. The “war profiteers,” such as Hossein Shariatmadari [Supreme Leader appointee at Kayhan newspaper] and a number of commanders of the Revolutionary Guard and repressive forces, see the survival of the Islamic Republic in keeping the country in a “state of emergency, neither war, nor peace,” so that they can ensure their dominance and survival by intensifying the atmosphere of suppression, repression, and widespread executions, including the execution of the protesters of January 2026. For example, Hossein Shariatmadari says: “We should ask Mr. Ghalibaf and Mr. Araghchi, wasn’t closing the Strait of Hormuz one of the main tools of our country in the Ramadan War and wasn’t closing the Strait of Hormuz blocking the enemy’s commercial and economic breathing space and bringing it close to suffocation?! You gentlemen, with what logical justification and acceptable explanation are you going to give up this crucial tool?! The US and its allies have martyred the great leader of Islamic Iran and the Islamic world, and shed the blood of dozens of nuclear scientists and high-ranking military commanders, hundreds of innocent people, and innocent students. They have caused hundreds of billions of dollars in damages and… Now, by opening the Strait of Hormuz and charging service fees (!) from passing ships, are we going to openup their economic and commercial bottleneck?! and prepare the ground for their next attacks and crimes?!” 

Or Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of parliament and member of the “JebhehPaidari” [Perseverance Front], who says about the recent war between Iran and the US-Israel and the negotiations and possible agreement: "We knocked America down and sat on its chest to finish the job, but suddenly we went to the negotiating table and want to make an agreement so that they can come and sit on our chest." 

…Of course, these divisions among the government factions do not necessarily mean a deep and immediate crisis in the political power structure, but they do indicate that there is no clear consensus among them about the future direction of the country. The hardliners or the hard core of power and forces close to the IRGC and repressive institutions emphasize the continuation of current policies, while others, concerned about the future of the regime, call for some kind of re-evaluation of domestic and foreign policies. 

Perhaps no institution has benefited from this situation as much as the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Over the past two decades, this institution has transformed from a military force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to a major and decisive player in the country’s economy, politics, and security apparatus. The continuation of regional crises and the escalation of tensions with the West have greatly contributed to this transformation of the Corps. For this reason, from the perspective of a part of the ruling power structure, the current situation is not only a threat to the survival of the regime, but can also be an opportunity to intensify repression and monopolization and to stabilize the political and economic situation. 

Historical experience has shown that political systems are more likely to suffer from their inability to manage internal crises than from external pressure. Suppressing popular protests may temporarily prevent the spread of unrest, but it cannot eliminate the roots of discontent that result from the regime’s anti-people policies, widespread and systematic corruption in government institutions, and the continued climate of widespread repression and oppression. 

In addition, the younger generation, that constitutes the majority of the country’s population, has specific demands that reflect the conditions and social developments in the world today. Widespread access to information, communication with the outside world, and changing social values ​​have caused this generation’s expectations of the regime and society to change. At the same time, the Islamic Republic has shown over the past four decades that it has a significantcapability for survival and adaptation to circumstances. The regime has repeatedly faced serious crises and has been able to continue its rule with violent and bloody repression. 

The fundamental question is not whether there is a crisis or not; the crisis is obvious. The real question is whether the regime can save itself despite all the serious internal and external challenges? The answer to this question will determine not only the fate of the Islamic Republic, but also the future of millions of Iranians. When the threat of war looms large, democratic demands are marginalized. Any political criticism is labelled as “undermining national security”. Any social protest is labelled a “security threat”. In such an environment, “security” replaces politics and “survival of the regime” becomes the code name for the policy of violent and widespread suppression of people’s rights. 

The current situation and the invasion of Iran by US imperialism may have helped to preserve the ruling “political system” to some extent, but this does not mean that the accumulated problems of society have been solved. Poverty, corruption, unemployment, discrimination, and the lack of basic freedoms will not disappear with "security" measures. Today, Iran needs, more than ever, a lasting peace and the formation of an inclusive and democratic social movement, a movement that can transform the diverse demands of workers, women, students, teachers, pensioners, intellectuals, and all progressive political forces into a common project for fundamental changes. The weakness of Iran’s left and democratic forces lies in their fragmentation. The regime has been able to suppress or contain each movement separately, because no lasting link has been formed between these movements. But the future of Iran depends on overcoming this fragmentation. Today, the main issue is to create a democratic alternative that has a clear demarcation with both domestic tyranny and foreign intervention and can organize the people’s struggle against both. A society that has fought for freedom, justice, and human dignity many times over now needs unity, organization, and a progressive, shared vision more than ever. The future of the country will not be determined in the negotiating rooms of world powers, nor in the calculations of security apparatus. What will determine the future of Iran is the ability of social forces to transform public discontent into a democratic project and a joint, nationwide struggle with the people frustrated with oppression and deprivation. 

Perhaps the most important lesson of these years is this: No ruling power gives up its privileges voluntarily. Democracy is not a gift from rulers, but the achievement of a society that organizes and fights for it.

 

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For the statements of the Tudeh Party of Iran and its analysis of major developments in Iran Please visit:    www.tudehpartyiran.org

 

 

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